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Abstract 
Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research 
has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment 
and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence 
that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences 
– as classically assumed – but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the 
right thing”. Here we argue that the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand 
(2018) comprise prominent methodological confounds and open questions that 
bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) 
preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with 
preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference 
to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and 
conducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference 
hypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that 
prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for 
doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychological theory, 
however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the 
preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case. 
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Introduction 
People often pay costs to benefit others; they behave prosocially. 
Fundamental to human social life (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gintis et al, 2003; Nowak, 
2006; Tomasello, 2014), prosocial behavior is often explained by appeal to 
reciprocity. If I pay a cost to help you today, you – or others who learn about my 
behavior – are more likely to help me tomorrow (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Rand & 
Nowak, 2013; Trivers, 1971). Defying explanations of this kind, however, prosocial 
behavior is frequently observed in contexts where opportunities for reciprocity are 
absent. For example, in anonymous, one-shot interactions, individuals often forego 
some amount of self-interest to the benefit of strangers (Camerer, 2003).  
Behavioral economists have classically sought to explain such behavior by 
assuming that individuals have preferences for minimizing inequity or maximizing 
efficiency (i.e., social welfare) (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Capraro, 2013; Charness & 
Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levin, 1998). 
According to these influential frameworks, prosocial individuals derive utility – 
psychological benefit – from particular social outcomes; thus, realizing those 
outcomes offsets the cost of behaving prosocially.  
A recent alternative perspective is that individuals derive utility from 
performing actions they perceive to be morally right (Bicchieri, 2005; DellaVigna et 
al., 2012; Huck et al., 2012; Krupka & Weber, 2013). This perspective accords with 
evidence from social psychology that individuals derive utility from seeing 
themselves in a positive moral light (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Dunning, 2007) and, in 
addition, that prosocial individuals in particular view opportunities for prosocial 
action in moral terms; for example, by considering what the morally “right” action is 
(Liebrand et al., 1986; Weber et al., 2004).  
Building on these converging lines of evidence, recent experimental work 
advanced the hypothesis that a generalized morality preference – rather than 
preferences for minimizing inequity or maximizing efficiency per se – drives 
prosocial behavior in anonymous, one-shot interactions (Capraro & Rand, 2018). In 
other words, that a simple preference for doing (what is perceived to be) the morally 
“right” thing underpins individuals’ prosociality in these contexts.  
In their key experiments, Capraro and Rand (2018) used a “Trade-Off Game” 
(TOG) to empirically dissociate the hypothesized morality preference from outcome-
based social preferences for equity and efficiency. In the TOG, participants made a 
unilateral choice about how to allocate money between themselves and two other 
(passive) people. While one choice minimized inequity – all participants earned the 
same amount – the other choice maximized efficiency – participants earned 
different amounts, but, together, the group earned more. This design effectively 
pitted preferences for equity and efficiency against one another; creating a decision 
context where the morally “right” choice was ambiguous. The researchers found 
that, framing either choice as the morally appropriate one dramatically affected 
participants’ choices, such that the majority chose the option framed as morally 
appropriate; be that the equitable or efficient choice.  
To support the inference that these moral considerations drive prosociality, 
however, required additional evidence. To that end, participants also completed, in 
addition to the TOG, a canonical prosocial choice task; either the Dictator Game 
(DG), or the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In the latter tasks, participants made a 
unilateral choice about how much money to donate to a new (passive) person (DG), 
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or a simultaneous bilateral choice whether to cooperate with a new person (PD), 
respectively.  
The key finding in Capraro and Rand (2018) was that participants who made 
the choice framed as morally appropriate in the TOG – be that the equitable choice 
or the efficient choice – were consistently more prosocial in the DG and PD; 
donating and cooperating (respectively) more than participants who chose 
otherwise in the TOG. Crucially, this result is inconsistent with stable outcome-
based preferences for equity or efficiency as explanations for prosociality, which do 
not predict an association between moral framing in the TOG and prosociality in a 
different task, such as the DG/PD. The result is instead consistent with the morality 
preference hypothesis, which predicts that individuals sensitive to which choice is 
morally right in the TOG – as revealed by the moral framing of those choices – are 
also revealed to be more prosocial in the DG/PD; where, in contrast to the TOG, the 
morally right choice is unambiguous (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007; Krueger & 
DiDonato, 2010).  
The implication of Capraro and Rand’s (2018) findings is important: They 
suggest their data renders the classic approach to understanding prosocial choice 
through social preferences insufficient and, in particular, that an account based on a 
fluid preference for “doing the morally right thing” is superior. However, their key 
evidence derives from an experimental design that contains several prominent 
methodological confounds, and leaves open important questions regarding the 
mechanism of the hypothesized morality preference. Below we expand on these 
issues.  
 
Self-interest 
Consider the choice outcomes in the TOG. The equitable choice always 
provided the participants – the chooser, and two passive recipients – the same 
allocation; 13 Monetary Units (MU) each. The efficient choice, in contrast, always 
provided the chooser with 15 MU, and the passive recipients 23 MU and 13 MU, 
respectively. Thus, while the efficient choice clearly results in greater overall gains 
for the group – at the cost of equity, as intended – it also results in greater gains for 
the chooser themselves. In other words, the choice option meant to reveal a 
preference for efficiency is confounded with self-interest. A plausible consequence 
of this confound is an overestimate of the proportion of individuals with a preference 
for efficiency. An overestimation of this kind may have affected the key result – an 
association between TOG choice and prosociality in the DG/PD – in two ways.  
First, it may have inflated the association between TOG choice under the 
equitable-is-moral frame, and prosociality in the DG/PD. Specifically, this 
association may not have been driven by participants with a genuine morality 
preference – who choose the equitable option under this TOG frame, and the 
prosocial option in the DG/PD – but, rather, by self-interested participants – who 
choose the efficient option under this TOG frame, and the self-interested option in 
the DG/PD. Indeed, in the worst case, the behavior of self-interested participants 
could fully account for the observed association between TOG choice under the 
equitable-is-moral frame, and prosociality in the DG/PD. 
Second, by the opposite logic, the overestimation of individuals with a 
preference for efficiency may have deflated the association between TOG choice 
under the efficient-is-moral frame, and prosociality in the DG/PD. This is because 
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some participants making the efficient choice under that TOG frame did so not 
because of a general morality preference nudged by the framing, but, rather, for 
their own self-interest. Crucially, these participants would not have chosen 
prosocially in the DG/PD, thereby deflating the observed association between the 
two choices.  
These issues directly affect the key evidence – an association between TOG 
choice and prosociality in the DG/PD – supporting the morality preference 
hypothesis. A remedy to these issues is to remove self-interest from the equation by 
design.   
 
Action-inaction asymmetry 
Not only do the efficient-is-moral and equitable-is-moral frames differ in the 
labels used to describe the two choice options, but, in addition, they differ in which 
is the active choice and which is the passive choice. Specifically, in the efficient-is-
moral frame, participants start with an equitable allocation (13 MU each), while in 
the equitable-is-moral frame they start with an efficient allocation (15, 23, and 13 
MU, respectively). In other words, the moral choice is always framed as an active 
choice to change these initial allocations. Choice frame is thus confounded with 
active/passive frame. 
A substantial body of work in social, moral, and decision-making psychology 
indicates that humans perceive inaction differently than action (Baron & Ritov, 2004; 
Spranca et al., 1991). For example, regret is greater for actions that lead to negative 
outcomes than for inactions that lead to the same negative outcomes (Feldman & 
Albarracín, 2017; Zeelenberg et al., 2002); individuals are biased towards 
maintaining the status quo in decision-making (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988); 
and, in moral judgment, harms caused by action are considered worse than the 
same harms caused by inaction (Cushman et al., 2006). Finally, most relevant here, 
action framing influences engagement in prosocial behavior (Teper & Inzlicht, 2011), 
and there is considerable variation in who exhibits action-inaction asymmetries 
(Baron & Ritov, 2004). 
Given this evidence, it is probable that the confounding of choice frame with 
active/passive frame over- or under-estimated the proportion (and types) of 
individuals choosing the morally-framed option in the TOG; with unknown 
consequences for the key association between TOG choice and prosociality in the 
DG/PD. Decoupling these frames is necessary to make clear inferences about the 
effect of choice frame in the TOG. 
 
Doing good vs. avoiding bad 
An influential hypothesis in social psychology is that immoral, negative, or 
otherwise “bad” stimuli weigh more heavily than their “good” counterparts in human 
cognition and behavior (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish et 
al., 2008; see Corns, 2018 for a recent critique).  
Consistent with this hypothesis, recent evidence suggests that “self-
righteousness” – manifested in, for example, the average person rating themselves 
morally superior to the average person (Tappin & McKay, 2017) – are greater for 
immoral than moral stimuli (Klein & Epley, 2016, 2017). Relatedly, the correlation 
between individuals’ life satisfaction and their self-perception is reportedly stronger 
if the latter is computed as the distance between individuals’ “real” and “undesired” 
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selves vs. between their “real” and “desired” selves (Ogilvie, 1987). In other words, 
those data suggest the type of person individuals want to avoid being weighs more 
heavily (in their life appraisal) than the type of person they would ideally like to be. A 
similar asymmetry manifests in the psychology of moral regulation. In particular, in 
the distinction between proscriptive morality – what we should do and be – and 
prescriptive morality – what we should avoid doing and being. Whereas the former 
is considered discretionary and a matter of personal preference, the latter is 
considered mandatory and strict (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).  
To implement the choice framing in the TOG, the two choice options were 
jointly framed as moral and immoral, respectively. Individuals choosing the morally-
framed option may thus have been motivated by a preference to do “good” (e.g., a 
desire to be moral), or motivated by a preference to avoid “bad” (e.g., an aversion to 
being immoral). These distinct preferences are confounded in the TOG design. 
Given the preceding evidence, it is plausible that individuals’ choices were 
motivated more by a preference to avoid “bad” than to do “good”. Furthermore, 
assuming this hypothesis, a further plausible hypothesis is that participants who 
were motivated by a preference to do “good” (vs. avoid “bad”) in the TOG were 
more likely to behave prosocially in the DG/PD. For example, because the 
preference to avoid bad may reflect a general desire to avoid punishment, whereas 
a preference to do good may reflect a desire to do good for its own sake. That is, 
the latter preference is more diagnostic of true prosocial motivation.  
 
The current study 
Here we address the methodological confounds and open theoretical 
questions in Capraro and Rand (2018), and, thus, provide a refined and extended 
test of the morality preference hypothesis. To do so, we design and implement an 
improved Trade-Off Game (TOG), and test for an effect of choice frame on TOG 
choice (Hypothesis 1), and for an association between framing of the TOG and 
prosociality in a different task, the DG (Hypothesis 3). We also test two novel 
hypotheses bearing on existing psychological theory. First, that the effect of choice 
frame on TOG choice is greater under an avoid “bad” than do “good” moral frame 
(Hypothesis 2) (cf. Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish et al., 
2008). Second, that the association between choosing the morally-framed option in 
the TOG, and prosociality in the DG, is greater under a do “good” than avoid “bad” 
moral frame (Hypothesis 4). 
 
Methods 
 
The hypotheses, design, sampling and analysis plan were preregistered on 
the Open Science Framework (protocol: https://osf.io/9nphs/).  
 
Participants 
We sought to collect N=200 participants per treatment, giving a total N=800. 
We determined this sample size by multiplying the N-per-treatment in Capraro and 
Rand (2018) study 3 by 1.5x; the study most conceptually similar to that which we 
reproduce here. Sensitivity power analyses (reported in SI) for our key hypothesis 
tests indicated we had sufficient power (>.80) to detect standardized effect sizes 
conventionally considered small (r =.10). A total of N=801 participants completed 
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the study. Participants were recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) 
(for the validity of AMT, see e.g., Arechar et al., 2018; Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci 
et al., 2014; Thomas & Clifford, 2017), and were located in the US at the time of 
taking part. All participants provided informed consent. This study was reviewed 
and approved by Middlesex University, and Royal Holloway, University of London 
ethics procedures.  
 
Procedure 
Participants began by playing a Dictator Game (DG). In the DG, they were 
given $0.10 and they had to decide how much, if any, to give to another anonymous 
participant who received no starting money allocation. Participants could donate in 
increments of $0.01; from $0.00 to $0.10. The participant was informed that the 
other person had no active choice and would only receive what they decide to give. 
We asked two comprehension questions to ensure that participants understood the 
payoff structure of the DG prior to their decision. Specifically, we asked which 
choice (1) maximized their own payoff, and which choice (2) equalized their payoff 
with that of the other person. Participants who failed either or both comprehension 
questions were prevented from completing the survey (this condition was made 
explicit in the consent form). Those who passed the comprehension questions were 
then asked to make their DG decision. 
Following the DG, participants played an improved Trade-Off Game (TOG). In 
this TOG, participants (“choosers”) had to decide between two choice options that 
affected their own payoff and the payoff of two other people; the latter being 
passive recipients who did not make any choices. One option was “equitable”, in 
the sense that it minimized payoff differences among the three participants; 
specifically, they each earned $0.13. The other option was “efficient”, in the sense 
that it maximized the sum of the payoffs of the three participants; specifically, the 
chooser earned $0.13, while the other two people earned $0.23 and $0.13, 
respectively. Importantly, in this improved TOG design, because the chooser earns 
$0.13 by making either choice, the confounding of self-interest with preferences for 
efficiency is eliminated. Furthermore, because participants are not told that one or 
the other state of money distribution ([13, 13, 13] or [13, 23, 13]) initially holds, both 
choice options are rendered equal in terms of active/passive frame. 
Before reading the TOG instructions, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four versions of the TOG, each corresponding to a particular framing 
combination in a 2x2 between-subjects design:  
 
•   TOG frame: Give – Do Good 
•   TOG frame: Give – Avoid Bad 
•   TOG frame: Equalize – Do Good 
•   TOG frame: Equalize – Avoid Bad 
 
We experimentally manipulate whether the efficient (“Give”) or equitable 
(“Equalize”) choice is framed as morally appropriate (choice frame1: Give, Equalize). 
                                                
1 Following Capraro & Rand (2018), in our preregistered protocol and analysis script we labelled the 
efficient-is-moral frame the “Give” frame, and the equitable-is-moral frame the “Equalize” frame. For 
consistency, we follow that convention here. 
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Furthermore, we also manipulate whether the moral framing emphasizes doing 
“good” or avoiding “bad” (moral frame: Do Good, Avoid Bad): 
 
•   Under the Give – Do Good frame, the efficient option is labelled “be 
generous, Option 1”, and the equitable option is “Option 2” 
•   Under the Give – Avoid Bad frame, the efficient option is labelled “Option 2”, 
and the equitable option is “be ungenerous, Option 1” 
•   Under the Equalize – Do Good frame, the efficient option is labelled “Option 
2”, and the equitable option is “be fair, Option 1” 
•   Under the Equalize – Avoid Bad frame, the efficient option is labelled “be 
unfair, Option 1”, and the equitable option is “Option 2” 
 
Importantly, notice that the experimental manipulation of moral frame 
decouples the preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid “bad”. After 
making their decision in the TOG, participants provided standard demographic 
information, at the end of which they were given the completion code needed to 
submit the survey on AMT. After the end of the survey, we downloaded the data file 
and computed the bonuses, which were paid on top of the base participation fee 
received by all participants ($0.50). No deception was used. We refer to the SI for 
verbatim experimental instructions (available here: https://osf.io/m7w2s/). We report 
all measures, manipulations and exclusions. 
 
Results 
 
Data analysis was conducted in R (v.3.4.0, R Core Team, 2017) using 
RStudio (v.1.1.423, RStudio Team, 2016). R packages used in analysis and figures: 
ggplot2 (v.2.2.1, Wickham, 2009), plyr (v.1.8.4, Wickham, 2011), dplyr (v.0.7.4, 
Wickham et al., 2017), reshape (v.0.8.7, Wickham, 2007), gridExtra (v.2.3, Auguie & 
Antonov, 2017), effsize (v.0.7.1, Torchiano, 2017), data.table (v.1.10.4-3, Dowle et 
al., 2017). The raw data and code to reproduce all results and figures in this paper 
are available at https://osf.io/x5stj/.    
 
Data exclusions 
N=288 (26.45%) participants answered one or more of the comprehension 
questions incorrectly, or did not answer these questions, and were thus prevented 
from completing the study (following our preregistered protocol). Of the remaining 
N=801 participants who completed the study, there were N=15 (1.87%) duplicate 
responses according to participants’ IP address/unique Mechanical Turk ID. In line 
with our preregistered protocol, we excluded these duplicates, retaining the earliest 
responses only—defined by the date/time they began the study. Finally, after these 
exclusions, we identified N=2 (0.25%) participants that dropped out of the study 
prior to making their decision in the TOG, and are thus unable to be included in the 
analysis (leaving N=784 for analysis). 
 
Hypotheses 1 & 2 
 
Preregistered analyses 
 8 
We first test whether participants were more likely to choose the efficient 
option in the TOG under the “give” choice frame than under the “equalize” choice 
frame (Hypothesis 1). We then test whether this framing effect was stronger under 
the “avoid bad” moral frame than under the “do good” moral frame (Hypothesis 2). 
To that end, we fit a binomial logistic regression model with two dummy-coded 
treatment variables as predictors: choice frame [0=equalize frame, 1=give frame] 
and moral frame [0=avoid bad, 1=do good], and choice in the TOG as the 
dependent variable [TOG choice: 0=equitable choice, 1=efficient choice]. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, choice frame predicted TOG choice in the 
expected direction, Odds Ratio (OR) = 3.55, 95% CI [2.34, 5.40], Z = 5.94 p <.001. 
A majority of participants chose the efficient option under the give choice frame 
(69.21%), whereas only a minority of participants chose this option under the 
equalize choice frame (39.90%).  
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, there is no statistically significant interaction 
between choice frame and moral frame, OR = 0.91 [0.50, 1.64], Z = -0.32, p =.752. 
In other words, the effect of choice frame appeared largely independent of whether 
the choice was framed as “doing good” or “avoiding bad”. Both H1 and H2 results 
remain similar after adjusting for age, gender [not female=0, female=1] and 
education [0=less than college, 1=college or above] in the model: Main effect of 
choice frame OR = 3.74 [2.45, 5.72], Z = 6.11, p <.001; interaction between choice 
frame and moral frame OR = 0.89 [0.49, 1.61], Z = -0.39, p =.697. The proportion of 
choices in each of the four treatments is displayed in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of efficient and equitable choices as a function of 
treatment. Error bars are ± 1 SEM. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
Preregistered analyses 
 Next, we test the hypothesis that participants who make the ‘moral’ choice in 
the TOG – that is, choose the efficient option under the “give” frame, or choose the 
equitable option under the “equalize” frame – donate more to their partner in the DG 
(Hypothesis 3). We fit a linear regression model with two dummy-coded variables as 
predictors: TOG choice frame [0=equalize frame, 1=give frame] and the choice the 
participant made in the TOG [0=equitable choice, 1=efficient choice], respectively. 
The DV is amount donated in the DG [from 0 to 10].  
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, there is an interaction in the predicted 
direction, b = 1.68, SE = 0.40, t = 4.17, p <.001. Under the equalize frame, 
participants who made the equitable choice donated more in the DG (M = 3.40, SD 
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= 2.60) than participants who made the efficient choice (M = 2.38, SD = 2.57), t 
(389) = 3.81, p <.001, hedges’ g = 0.39, 95% CI [0.19, 0.60]. This pattern was 
reversed under the give frame. There, participants who made the equitable choice 
donated less in the DG (M = 2.53, SD = 2.75) than participants who made the 
efficient choice (M = 3.19, SD = 2.80), t (391) = -2.19, p =.029, hedges’ g = -0.24 [-
0.45, -0.02]. (Note: All t-tests are post-hoc.) This interaction between choice frame 
and TOG choice remains similar after adjusting for age, gender, and education, b = 
1.67, SE = 0.40, t = 4.14, p <.001. The interaction pattern is displayed in Figure 2 
(panel A). As seen in Figure 2, DG donations follow an approximately bimodal 
distribution peaking over donations of 0 and 5. We thus conducted exploratory 
analyses to test the robustness of the preceding linear regression results (reported 
in SI). These were consistent with the linear regression models.  
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Figure 2. Violin plots (A) and boxplots (B) of DG donations as a function of 
choice frame, and the choice the participants made, in the TOG. A, points 
denote the mean values and error bars are ± 1 SEM. B, bolded centre lines denote 
the median values. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 
 
Preregistered analyses 
In our final preregistered analysis, we test whether the difference in DG 
donations between participants who made the ‘moral’ vs. ‘non-moral’ choice in the 
TOG is larger under the “do good” frame than under the “avoid bad” frame 
(Hypothesis 4). In line with our preregistered protocol, to simplify this analysis, we 
collapse across two variables: TOG choice frame [equalize, give], and the TOG 
choice the participant made [efficient, equitable]. This provides a new binary 
variable denoting whether the participant made the moral choice in the TOG [0=no, 
1=yes], where the moral choice is simply defined as either the efficient option under 
the “give” frame, or the equitable option under the “equalize” frame. We then fit a 
linear regression model with two variables as predictors: moral choice [0=no, 
1=yes], and moral frame [0=avoid bad, 1=do good]. As before, the DV is amount 
donated in the DG [0-10].  
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 4, there is no statistically significant interaction 
between moral choice and moral frame on DG donations, b = -0.32, SE = 0.40, t = -
0.79, p =.429. In other words, while participants who made the moral choice in the 
TOG tended to donate more in the DG than participants who made the non-moral 
choice (i.e., Hypothesis 3), this effect appeared largely independent of whether the 
participants made their TOG choice under the moral frame of “doing good” or 
“avoiding bad”. Adjusting for age, gender, and education in the model did not 
meaningfully change this result, b = -0.33, SE = 0.40, t = -0.81, p =.418 (see SI for 
robustness checks). 
 
 
Discussion 
Converging evidence suggests that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot 
interactions is not solely motivated by outcome-based social preferences, but that it 
is also motivated by what individuals perceive to be the morally right action 
(Bicchieri, 2005; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Eriksson et al, 2017; Kimbrough & 
Vostroktunov, 2016; Krupka & Weber, 2013); perhaps serving to maintain a positive 
moral self-image (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Dunning, 2007). Building on this work, 
recent experimental evidence advanced the hypothesis that a generalized morality 
preference drives prosocial behavior in anonymous, one-shot interactions like that 
in Dictator and Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Capraro & Rand, 2018). This hypothesis 
rejects the classic view in behavioral economics that prosociality in these situations 
is driven by social preferences for equity and efficiency.  
Here we identified prominent methodological confounds and open theoretical 
questions in the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018). In particular, 
their Trade-Off Game (TOG) design (i) confounds preferences for efficiency with 
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self-interest, and (ii) preferences for action with preferences for morality. Moreover, 
the design fails to dissociate preferences to do “good” from preferences to avoid 
doing “bad”. It is highly likely these issues affected the observed association 
between choice in the TOG, and prosociality in the DG/PD; the key evidence for the 
morality preference hypothesis. Likewise, the failure to decouple the preference to 
do “good” from that to avoid doing “bad” leaves the mechanism of the proposed 
morality preference unclear, and misses a key prediction from influential 
psychological theory; that “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister et al., 2001; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish et al., 2008). 
To address these issues, we designed and implemented an improved 
TOG/DG experiment – eliminating the confounds identified in the original 
experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018). In doing so, we replicated the 
key results in support of the morality preference hypothesis. We found that framing 
one or the other TOG choice as morally appropriate – by labelling the focal choice 
“fair” or “generous”, or the counterpart choice “unfair” or “ungenerous” – strongly 
affected individuals’ choices. Specifically, approximately 70% of individuals chose 
the efficient option when that choice was framed as morally appropriate, dropping 
to 40% when the equitable choice was framed as morally appropriate; a swing of 
30%, and a reverse in the majority decision. More importantly, we found that 
individuals who chose the morally appropriate option in the TOG – be that the 
efficient option or the equitable option – were more prosocial in the preceding DG; 
donating more money to a stranger. This result was robust to various analytic 
specifications, and provides evidence that prosociality (in the DG) is driven by a 
preference for doing what is perceived to be morally right.  
Our results lend experimental support to various alternatives to outcome-
based preference models (e.g., Alger & Weibull, 2013; Brekke et al., 2003; 
Kimbrough & Vostroktunov, 2016; Krupka & Weber, 2013; Lazear et al., 2012; Levitt 
& List, 2017). In particular, these models assume that individuals have moral 
preferences that guide their prosocial decision-making in unilateral interactions; an 
assumption consistent with the current findings. A parallel class of models has 
sought to explain prosocial decision-making using an intention-based framework, 
according to which people are sensitive to others’ intentions (Falk et al., 2008; 
McCabe et al., 2003; Rabin, 1993). These models have been useful in explaining 
prosociality observed in interactions with more than one active player. However, 
they are of limited use in the case of unilateral interactions – which are the focus of 
the current study – where beliefs about the intentions of others do not apply. 
Reputation-based models (e.g., Heck & Krueger, 2017; Jordan et al., 2016; Nowak 
& Sigmund, 2005) also appear of limited use for our results because choices were 
anonymous and one-shot. 
Our findings are consistent with work in social psychology that suggests 
individuals are motivated to maintain a positive moral self-image (Dunning, 2007). 
Indeed, an open question at the intersection of this research is whether individuals 
who assign greater value to a moral self-image (Aquino & Reed, 2002) show 
stronger choice framing effects in the TOG, and/or a stronger association between 
TOG choice and prosociality in the DG/PD. That said, we note that it is unlikely 
individuals are solely motivated by what they perceive to be the right thing, 
especially across different choice contexts. In line with Capraro and Rand (2018), 
we do expect that these results extend to the PD. There is some recent evidence, 
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however, that behavior in other economic games is driven by outcome-based 
preferences, and not by a general morality preference (Capraro, 2018). An 
interesting avenue for future work is thus to further explore the boundary conditions 
of the morality preference account. One avenue might be situations in which people 
have to trade-off conflicting moral principles, like in the case of “altruistic” lying; that 
is, lying to benefit others (Biziou-van-Pol et al., 2015; Erat & Gneezy, 2012). An open 
empirical question is whether and how preferences for morality – as revealed by 
choice in the TOG – predict moral trade-offs of this kind. 
We found that a moral frame emphasizing “good” affected TOG choice as 
strongly as a moral frame emphasizing “bad”. For example, the proportion of 
individuals switching from the efficient choice to the equitable choice was 
essentially identical (approx. 30%) whether the latter choice was labelled “fair” or 
the former choice “unfair”. We thus found little evidence that “bad” (framing) was 
stronger than “good” (framing) in prosocial choice (cf. Baumeister et al., 2001).  
An explanation for this discrepancy is found in recent work that has criticized 
the dominance of “bad” over “good” (termed the negativity bias) on theoretical and 
empirical grounds (Corns, 2018). A particular criticism concerns the credible 
alternative explanations for much of the evidence base. For example, asymmetries 
in perception that are taken to support the stronger effect of negatively-valenced 
stimuli may instead be explained by differences in the informativeness of negative 
vs. positive stimuli (Corns, 2018). In research on impression formation, as a case in 
point, the greater weight assigned to immoral (vs. moral) traits may be explained by 
the fact that immoral traits tend to be more informative of others’ character 
(Kellermann, 1984). In the case of self-perception, in contrast, it is likely this 
informativeness bias does not hold; for example, because individuals can introspect 
on their full “moral history”, unlike when they are judging other people. Absent a 
difference in informativeness, immoral and moral traits may yield similar impact on 
judgment and behavior.  
This provides a plausible explanation for our results, and is consistent with a 
recent critique of the negativity bias hypothesis (Corns, 2018). This explanation also 
clarifies why the observed association between choosing the morally-framed option 
in the TOG, and prosociality in the DG, was similar under the “good” vs. “bad” 
moral frame (i.e., rejection of H4). Specifically, because the frames were equally 
motivating, individuals choosing the morally-framed option in either frame were 
equally liable to donate more in the DG. It is important to highlight that our “bad” 
frame label was symmetric vis-à-vis our “good” frame label (e.g., “unfair” vs. “fair”, 
respectively). Had we used frames with stronger, but asymmetric labels – such as 
“steal” in place of “unfair” – we may have elicited an asymmetric moral frame effect 
in line with the negativity bias hypothesis. As noted above, however, in that case it 
may have been unclear whether the moral frame asymmetry was due to the valence 
of the frames per se (i.e., bad vs. good), or other differences such as asymmetric 
strength or salience of the labels (cf. Corns, 2018). 
Finally, our results add to a growing body of research on framing effects in 
prosocial choice. Prior work finds that situational labels sometimes impact prosocial 
decision-making (e.g., Capraro & Vanzo, 2018; Kay & Ross, 2003; Krupka & Weber, 
2013; Larrick & Blount, 1997; Liberman et al., 2004), but not always (Dreber et al., 
2013; Goerg et al., 2017). This suggests the effect of labels may depend on the 
specific interaction or game type. Our findings replicate recent work showing that 
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labels are highly effective in the Trade-Off Game (Capraro, 2018; Capraro & Rand, 
2018). 
In summary, recent experimental work advanced the hypothesis that 
prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions is not driven by outcome-based 
social preferences for equity or efficiency per se, but by a generalized morality 
preference for “doing the right thing” (Capraro & Rand, 2018). We identified 
prominent methodological confounds and open theoretical questions in this work, 
and, consequently, conducted a refined and extended test of the morality 
preference hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that 
prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for 
doing the morally right thing. Furthermore, consistent with a recent critique of the 
negativity bias hypothesis, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as 
potent as the preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case. 
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